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Damage-assessment on 
the building of 
international law
After the Italian Constitutional Court’s decision no. 
238 of 2014: no structural damage, just wear and tear
A reply to Felix Würkert
This symposium invites reflections on the intercourse 
between national courts and international law, in light of the 
recent judgment of the Constitutional Court of Italy (no. 238 
of 2014, of 22 October 2014). I briefly examine this judgment’s 
impact on international law in two respects. First, whether it 
can point to a new principle of international law. Second, 
whether it undermines international law as such.

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I have elsewhere summarised the main aspects of the ruling, 
and criticised its inward-looking approach. The Italian 
judges deliberately avoided engaging with international law 
and therefore their ruling serves, at most, as cheap-talk for 
the purpose of further negotiation with Germany, all tbd. 
From a substantive point of view, the reasoning of the 
Constitutional Court is not outlandish, I have reckoned. 
Indeed, the Italian court took pains to break immunity down 
to its essential elements, and questioned the putative 
priority of serene international relations over access to 
justice. The Italian court gave up the jus cogens argument, 
which was appealing instinctively but technically far from 
compelling. The proportionality analysis, instead, is a value 
judgment that can be criticised only on the merits. The shift 
managed to realign the values at stake. Rather than 
comparing the gravity of the crimes with the function of 
immunities, the Italian Constitutional Court compared the 
procedural effect of immunity with the procedural right of 
the victims. This linear interplay lends itself better to judicial 
review and to proportionality à la Alexy (and the gravity of 
war crimes enters from the back-door, indicating the 
disproportionately modest value of the value pursued in 
casu).
The ECtHR, in Jones v UK and, earlier, in Al-Adsani, had 
virtually refrained from real proportionality-testing, 
ultimately using respect of sovereign immunity (qua
international law) as a trump card: immunities recognised by 
international law inherently restrict access to justice. The 
Constitutional Court broke this axiomatic assumption and 
plunged into a proper balancing.
Felix Würkert wondered whether this deliberate rebellion 
against international law-as-we-know-it could mark the 
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start of a normative process. In other words, whether the 
Italian Constitutional Court has in fact provided a preview of 
international law-as-we-will-know-it. I think the question is 
legitimate and some thoughts are in order to answer it.
First, the Italian ruling cannot possibly hope to persuade the 
international community about the correctness of its 
conclusion under international law, because it expressly 
avoided a re-consideration of the international legal custom. 
Unlike the previous Ferrini judgment, the Constitutional 
Court’s decision confined itself to deploy judicial authority in
foro domestico. There is ample literature of how effective 
national courts can be in shaping international law through 
interpretation. This judgment did not try to do that, thus it 
cannot succeed.
Second, the Italian ruling could be relevant, quite apart from 
its (lack of) persuasive reading of international norms, as 
state practice. Regardless of its willingness to engage with 
international law, the ruling could qualify as relevant 
practice for the identification of an international law 
custom, and/or as subsequent practice to shed light on 
treaty obligations, or as application of a domestic rule 
capable of mirroring a general principle of law (here, the two 
latter hypotheses are unlikely to matter much). I side-line 
for a moment a clever remark (made here by Gradoni, who 
refers to the ILC’s works, para. 50): the current contradiction 
between the acts of the Italian executive, legislator and 
judiciary with respect to the same rule weakens the 
relevance of the state practice expressed by the acts of 
these bodies. Let us pretend that Italy’s position is 
unambiguous, and firmly conveyed by the judgment no. 238 
of 2014 of its constitutional tribunal.
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A notorious problem about the formation of customary law 
is the paradox whereby it is only in force when sufficient 
state practice is established, not before. As a result, early 
instances of state practice, which could ultimately prove 
critical to reach the threshold, are illegal at the time of their 
commission. This paradox prompts pioneering states to 
either (hypo 1) indulge in deliberate lies, claiming that their 
conduct is already part of common practice (see Ferrini, or 
Italy’s defence in The Hague); or (hypo 2) leave international 
law alone, and hope that their example will be picked up as 
soon as possible.
The former process relies on a hopeful fictio that is too easy 
to debunk. In the novel La Chartreuse de Parme, Stendhal 
relates the story of the edification of the prison tower where 
the main character is about to land jailed. The prince who 
ordered the building of the tower “conceived the strange 
notion of persuading his subjects that it had already been in 
existence for many years” and therefore forbade all citizens 
refer to the building works, which took place before 
everyone’s eyes. The full passage reads as follows:
Le prince mécontent de sa femme, qui fit bâtir cette prison 
aperçue de toutes parts, eut la singulière prétention de 
persuader à ses sujets qu’elle existait depuis longues années 
… Il était défendu de parler de cette construction, et de 
toutes les parties de la ville de Parme et des plaines voisines 
on voyait parfaitement les maçons placer chacune des 
pierres qui composent cet édifice pentagone.
The ICJ exposed the fictio and refused to uphold it (hypo 1). 
What is left, now, is the abstract possibility of state practice 
to form (hypo 2), outside Italy, and replicate the 
Constitutional Court’s message until the current 
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embarrassing balance (one state against all other states) 
shifts to a custom-generating ratio. Is there any margin for 
this process to occur?
The erosion of immunity for breach of international criminal 
law is a well-known process, which Felix Würkert has 
summarised. However, it has so far related essentially to the 
personal liability of the individuals involved, and does not 
touch upon the civil responsibility of the State to which the 
conduct is also attributed. To be true, it can be argued that 
this gulf is a normative oddity, and that State immunity in 
civil proceedings (better, the lack thereof) should go pari 
passu with personal immunity in criminal trials (ditto).
However, this is not a necessary conclusion, neither 
normatively nor logically, and presumably implies 
dissatisfaction with another missing parallel: immunity 
covers civil responsibility of State officials for conduct 
entailing criminal responsibility that, in turn, functional 
immunities do not cover. In other words, currently, 
individuals can invoke functional immunity in civil 
proceedings (see Jones v UK), not in criminal proceedings 
(see Pinochet), with respect to the same conduct. States and 
individuals are both immune from tort claims in foreign 
courts for acts jure imperii, as a principle. As long as this 
paradigm holds, no reference to the development of 
international criminal law makes a compelling case about 
the correct regulation of the civil (dark) side of immunities.
The development of the parallelism, in other words, is not 
already implicit in the folds of international law currently in 
force. The German Constitutional Court’s judgment on 
necessity and the UK Court of Appeal’s judgment in Belhaj
have little to say about this precise issue and are, in my view, 
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not particularly encouraging. In the former case, the 
German court expressly ruled out, for lack of state practice, 
the application of necessity as customary principle in State-
private relationships (see point 3.c). Not only did it not 
question the extent of sovereign immunities for acts jure 
imperii, but it expressly abode by a conservative method of 
custom-identification. The UK court, for its part, rebutted 
the appellants’ attempt to rely on “an unprecedented 
extension of state immunity” (para. 39). That the UK judges 
refrained from upholding an abnormally expanded immunity 
(i.e., over acts of local authorities alleged of conspiring with 
foreign ones) cannot logically be read as evidence of a 
restriction of the principle.
The shorthand answer to Felix Würkert’s provocative title, 
referring to a new custom and asking “well why not?” would 
simply be that Italy cannot unilaterally determine an 
international law custom. If several states were to follow the 
Italian judges’ breakaway, indeed “why not?” I do not think 
this is still the case, as more and more domestic cases seem 
to reinforce the notion of State immunity in cases involving 
torture, and the once close majority in Al-Adsani has become 
a comfortable 6 to 1 majority in Jones v UK.
True, international law as it currently stands displays a 
disturbing cul de sac. Individuals can shield themselves 
behind the States on behalf of which the acts were 
committed (a notion of fairness). States, on their part, shield 
themselves behind sovereign immunity (a principle of 
convenience). Accountability sometimes evaporates during 
this shell game. Victims seeking for a remedy might feel like 
a spectator of a game of Bonneteau, or jeu des trois cartes, 
where the Queen of Hearts (the judicial remedy) is promised 
to be under one of the cartes (for instance, the UN Charter, 
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the constitutional charter, the ECHR), but all attempts to 
locate it fail inexorably.
Is the Italian Constitutional Court’s ruling brave or smug, in 
certifying that at least one charter (in Italian, carta) will 
assist the victims’ attempt to find justice? Is it a Kadi-like 
decision, or rather Medellin-like? Because it invoked 
fundamental rights as the reason for disobedience, it is 
similar to Kadi. Medellin was also different in another 
respect: whereas the US Supreme Court blamed its own 
inability to comply with the ICJ’s ruling on the legislature’s 
inertia, the Italian parliament had indeed made all possible 
effort to adapt Italian law to the dispositif of Germany v Italy. 
The Constitutional Court’s disobedience therefore did not 
arise from a misalignment between domestic and 
international law, but aims at restoring such misalignment.
I do not think that this judgment will threaten the solidity of 
the international legal order built on the UN Charter, nor 
that it will significantly taint Italy with a dubious reputation 
of non-complier with international law obligations. The 
factual and legal matrix of the case is very peculiar and does 
not lend itself to repetition (but it will be interesting to see 
whether citizens from former Italian colonies will free-ride 
the Constitutional Court’s doctrine and sue Italy for 
damages). Similar impasses have been resolved in the past 
(see the war between the constitutional courts and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union) or have simply faded 
out (see the VCCR cases opposing the ICJ to the US). As 
exciting as it would be to indulge in game-changing 
predictions now, the most likely scenario is that, as it always 
does, the situation will adjust somehow, reaching possibly a 
new equilibrium, but without breaking free from the order of 
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international law altogether. The rules of the game might be 
updated, if ever slightly, but the game will be the same.
As Radiguet put it – with a wisdom that strikes considering 
his age at the time of writing – « l’ordre, à la longue, se met 
de lui-même autour des choses ».
Filippo Fontanelli is lecturer for international economic law at 
the University of Edinburgh.
All articles of the symposium appear as well 
on Verfassungsblog.
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